Third Strategic Dialogue and Pak-US relationship

If artificial smiles of cordiality, genial and firm handshakes, numerous photo-ops, vows of everlasting friendship and hollow promises for the future are considered the only parameters for success of diplomatic negotiations between high-ranking officials of two countries, then the third round of strategic dialogue between Pakistan and the United States, at Washington DC, has largely been a great achievement. If this round of negotiations between two nations, both playing a decisive role in the fate of terrorism, are evaluated against the facts and practicalities, then finding a ray of hope for peace and stability in the destabilised part of South Asia is little less than a Herculean task.

The latest round of strategic dialogue between America and Pakistan does not offer any hint for constructive change in the violent situation of the region, thus resulting in challenges for Pakistan. We cannot say, in the continuing peace process in Afghanistan (which also includes underground negotiations with the Taliban), what the nature of Pakistan's role will be, and if their legitimate security concerns will be addressed. Before the mid-term elections in the United States, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged Pakistani officials to make 'difficult decisions' and go after the Taliban. Before the US president's official visit to India, the Obama administration remained silent on the question of US role in resolving the Kashmir issue, despite the requests of the Pakistani foreign minister. Absence of any substance, except a $2 billion military package, during the news conference of Hillary Clinton and Shah Mahmood Qureshi, is enough to suggest that a collision of interests and differences in priorities still exists.



Military aid worth $2 billion is intended to enable the Pak Army to purchase indispensable military equipment from the United States, to effectively operate against the Taliban and associates of al-Qaeda, but the timeframe of this aid package makes us wonder if the US really wishes Pakistan to take decisive action against the well-funded and sufficiently-equipped militants. A five year aid package, from 2012 to 2016, by the Obama administration, which has made it very clear on many occasions that it will start to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by the end of July 2011, poses some new questions. If the United States is really serious about accomplishing its mission by the middle of next year, then allied forces, during the next eight months, will try to hit the Taliban hard, so that the US may reap as many advantages as possible. In the same period, on the other hand, to keep the Pak Army insufficiently equipped against sophisticated al-Qaeda suggests murky developments.



This conception is further empowered by the fact that the US has yet to pay Pakistan its share of $2 billion, a smaller part of operational expenses which the US pays annually as a partner in the war on terror. During the third round of strategic dialogue no reference was made to this by the US administration, despite the fact that the Pakistan Army has paid not only for its own part, but also for that of the US. In addition, the US has linked the humanitarian aid for flood victims with the civilian aid to be delivered under the Karry-Lugar bill. It means the US will not pay any additional amount for the rehabilitation of flood affectees.

The above-mentioned facts make it clear that at a time when war on terror has entered a final and decisive phase, Pakistan is being denied any substantial help to stand firmly. Also, the Pakistan Army, which is basically trained and organised to handle aggression along Eastern borders, is being forced to take decisive action against militants in North Waziristan. A military operation in North Waziristan has the potential to put financially weak Pakistan and an inadequately equipped Pak Army (to fight against Taliban ) directly at war with the Taliban in Afghanistan. This possibility probably best explains the hesitation of the Pak Army, which is always mindful of aggression from Eastern borders, to start operations in North Waziristan.

Kashmir is the main bone of contention between India and Pakistan, and has caused three wars between these neighbouring countries. Until the Kashmir issue is resolved peacefully, neither the Pakistani nation nor Pakistan's armed forces can be at peace from its Eastern borders. An appeal made by Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi that the US plays its role to solve the longstanding issue of Kashmir, actually expresses Pakistan's seriousness towards peace in Afghanistan. The Pakistan Army can take serious action against the Taliban and al-Qaeda when it has well-founded reasons to believe that sacredness of Eastern borders will not be violated. Thus demands made by the Obama administration, which clearly prefers Indian approval, at the expense of Kashmiri people and Pakistan's security concerns, are far from being realistic.

We make mistakes in moments, but we bear their results for years and decades to come. While envisaging new geo-political balance, it will be better for the US administration, regional stability and global peace not to ignore historical facts and geographical factors. Humans have a tendency not to learn from history, so history repeats itself. Barak Obama will be visiting India in November. During his stay in New Delhi, perhaps it will become clearer if he wishes to see history repeated, or prefers to alter its course.

( This article is also published on daily The Statesman on October 27, 2010 )
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